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a b s t r a c t
The concept of anonymity comes into play in a wide range of situations, varying from
voting and anonymous donations to postings on bulletin boards and sending emails.
The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms which can be
described probabilistically, while the agents’ behavior may be totally unpredictable,
irregular, and hence expressible only nondeterministically. Formal definitions of the
concept of anonymity have been investigated in the past either in a totally nondeterministic
framework, or in a purely probabilistic one. In this paper, we investigate a notion of
anonymity which combines both probability and nondeterminism, and which is suitable
for describing the most general situation in which the protocol and the users can have
both probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior. We also investigate the properties of the
definition for the particular cases of purely nondeterministic users and purely probabilistic
users. We formulate the notions of anonymity in terms of probabilistic automata, and we
describe protocols and users as processes in the probabilistic pi-calculus, whose semantics
is again based on probabilistic automata. Throughout the paper, we illustrate our ideas by
using the example of the dining cryptographers.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The concept of anonymity comes into play in those cases in which we want to keep secret the identity of the agents
participating in a certain event. There is a wide range of situations in which this property may be needed or desirable; for
instance: voting, anonymous donations, and posting on bulletin boards.
Anonymity is often formulated in amore general way as an information-hiding property, namely the property that a part
of information relative to a certain event is maintained secret. One should be careful, though, not to confuse anonymity with
other properties that fit the same description, notably confidentiality (aka secrecy). Let us emphasize the difference between
the two concepts with respect to sending messages: confidentiality refers to situations in which the content of the message
is to be kept secret; in the case of anonymity, on the contrary, it is the identity of the originator, or of the recipient, that has
to be kept secret. Analogously, in voting, anonymity means that the identity of the voter associated with each vote must be
hidden, and not the vote itself or the candidate voted for. A discussion about the difference between anonymity and other
information-hiding properties can be found in [16].
An important characteristic of anonymity is that it is usually relative to the capabilities of the observer. In general the
activity of a protocol can be observed by diverse kinds of observers, differing in the information they have access to. The
anonymity property depends critically on what we consider as observables. For example, in the situation of an anonymous
bulletin board, a posting by onemember of the group is kept anonymous to the othermembers; however, it may be possible
that the administrator of the board has access to some privileged information that may allow him to infer the member who
posted it.
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In general anonymity may be required for a subset of the agents only. In order to completely define anonymity for a
protocol it is therefore necessary to specify which set(s) of members has to be kept anonymous. A further generalization is
the concept of group anonymity: the members are divided into a number of sets, and it is revealed which one, among the
groups, is responsible for an event, but the information as to which particular member has performed the event remains
hidden. In this paper, however, we only consider the case of a single group of anonymous users.
Various formal definitions and frameworks for analyzing anonymity have been developed in literature. They can be
classified into approaches based on process-calculi and transition systems [33,30], epistemic logic [37,16], and ‘‘function
views’’ [19]. In this paper, we focus on an approach based on a (probabilistic) process-calculus and on probabilistic automata.
The framework and techniques of process calculi have been used extensively in the area of security, to formally define
security properties, and to verify cryptographic protocols. See, for instance, [2,21,29,32,3]. The common denominator is that
the various parties involved in the protocol are specified as concurrent processes and present typically a nondeterministic
behavior. In [33,30], the nondeterminismplays a crucial role in the definition of the concept of anonymity, a definitionwhich
is based on the so-called ‘‘principle of confusion’’: a system is anonymous if the set of the possible observable outcomes is
saturated with respect to the intended anonymous users. More precisely, if in one computation the culprit (the user who
performs the action) is i and the observable outcome is o, then for every other agent j there must be a computation where j
is the culprit and the observable is still o.
The principle of anonymity described above is elegant and general, however it is limited in that it does not cope with
quantitative information. Now, many protocols for anonymity use random mechanisms, see, for example, Crowds [28],
Onion Routing [38], and Freenet [12]. The probability distribution of these may be known or become known through
statistical experiments. From this knowledge, and the observables, onemay be able to differentiate the agents quantitatively,
namely to deduce that one agent is more likely (has higher probability) to be the culprit than the others. This means that we
do not have perfect anonymity. However the definition of the nondeterministic approach (in which of course the random
mechanisms are approximated by nondeterministic mechanisms) may still be satisfied, as long as it is possible for each
of the other agents to be the culprit, even with very low probability. In other words, the approach in [33,30], is based on
the membership relation, and it is therefore only able to detect the difference between possible and impossible, not the
quantitative differences.
Another advantage in taking into account probabilistic information is that it allows to classify various notions of
anonymity according to their strength. See for instance the hierarchy proposed by Reiter and Rubin [28]. In this paper
we explore a notion of anonymity which corresponds to the strongest one in [28], namely beyond suspicion1: from the
observables all agents appear equally likely to be the culprit.
A probabilistic notion of anonymitywas developed (as a part of a general epistemological approach) in [16]. The approach
there is purely probabilistic, in the sense that both the protocol and the users are assumed to act probabilistically. In
particular the emphasis is on the probability of the users to be the culprit.
In this work, we take the opposite point of view, namely we assume that we may know nothing about the users. They
may be totally unpredictable, and change attitude every time, so that the choice of being the culprit cannot be quantified
probabilistically, not even by repeating statistical observations. Namely, it is a typical nondeterministic choice.2We regard
this as a special case, though: In general, we assume that the behavior of the users may be in part probabilistic and in part
nondeterministic. As for the protocol, it may use mechanisms like coin tossing, or random selection of a nearby node, which
are supposed to exhibit a certain regularity and obey a probabilistic distribution. On the other hand, also the protocol can
behave nondeterministically in part, due, for instance, to the (unpredictable) interleaving of the parallel components.
In summary, we investigate a notion of anonymity which combines both probability and nondeterminism, and which
is suitable for describing the general situation in which both the users and the protocol can exhibit a combination of
probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior. We also investigate the properties of the definition for the particular cases
of purely nondeterministic users and purely probabilistic users.
One of the results of our investigation is that the property of anonymity does not depend on the probabilities of the
users (cfr. Section 6.1). We consider this independence to be a fundamental property of a good notion of anonymity. In
fact, a protocol for anonymity should be able to guarantee this property for every group of users, no matter what is their
probability distribution for being the culprit.
In order to define the notion of probability we need, of course, a model of computation able to express both probabilistic
and nondeterministic choices. This kind of systems is by nowwell established in literature, see for instance the probabilistic
automata of [34], and has been provided with solid mathematical foundations and sophisticated tools for verification. For
expressing the protocols, we will use the probabilistic asynchronous pi-calculus introduced in [17,27], whose semantics is
based on a model similar to [34].
Some of the results of this paper have appeared (without proofs) in [5].
1 To bemore precisewe should say thatwe think that it corresponds to the intended notion of beyond suspicion in [28].We cannot prove this correspondence
because the definition there is given only informally.
2 Some people consider nondeterministic choice as a probabilistic choice with unknown probabilities. Our opinion is that the two concepts are different:
the notion of probability implies that we can gain knowledge of the distribution by repeating the experiment under the same conditions and by observing
the frequency of the outcomes. In otherwords, from thepastwe canpredict the future. This prediction element is absent from thenotion of nondeterminism.
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Fig. 1. Classification of the actions in an anonymous system (cfr. [30]).
1.1. Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall the nondeterministic approach of [33,30] to the notion of
anonymity. In Section 3we recall the dining cryptographers’ Problem by Chaum [11], which will serve as a running example
throughout the paper, and wemotivate the necessity of copying with probabilities. In Section 4 we briefly recall some basic
notions about probabilistic automata and the probability of events (a more formal and detailed presentation can be found
in Appendix A.2). In Section 5 we illustrate the notions and assumptions which are at the basis of our notion of anonymity.
In Section 6 we propose our notion of anonymity and we show some of its properties, notably the independence from the
probability of the users. In Section 7 we consider the special case of purely nondeterministic users. In Section 8 we consider,
on the contrary, purely probabilistic systems, and we prove that, under certain conditions, our definition corresponds to
what in literature is known as conditional anonymity. In Section 11 we discuss other related work. Finally, in Section 12 we
conclude.
2. The nondeterministic approach to anonymity
In this section we briefly recall the approach in [33,30]. In these works, the actions of a system S are classified into three
sets (see Fig. 1):
– A: the actions whose performer is intended to remain anonymous for the observer,
– B: the actions that are intended to be completely visible to the observer,
– C: the actions that are intended to be hidden from the observer.
Typically the set A consists of actions of the form a(i), where a is a fixed ‘‘abstract’’ action (the same for all the elements
of A), and i represents the identity of an anonymous user. Hence:
A = {a(i) | i ∈ I},
where I is the set of all the identities of the anonymous users.
Consider a dummy action d (different from all actions in S) and let f be the function on the actions of A
⋃
B defined by
f (α) = d if α ∈ A, and f (α) = α otherwise. Then S is said to be (strongly) anonymous on the actions in A if
f −1(f (S\C)) ∼T S\C,
where, following the CSP notation [18], S\C is the system resulting from hiding C in S, f (S ′) is the system obtained from S ′
by applying the relabeling f to each (visible) action, f −1 is the relation inverse of f , and∼T represents trace equivalence.3
Intuitively, the above definition means that for any action sequence Eα ∈ A∗, if an observable trace t containing Eα (not
necessarily as a consecutive sequence) is a possible outcome of S\C , then, any trace t ′ obtained from t by replacing Eα with
an arbitrary Eα ′ ∈ A∗ must also be a possible outcome of S\C .
We now illustrate the above definition on the example of the dining cryptographers.
3. The dining cryptographers’ problem
This problem, described by Chaum in [11], involves a situation in which three cryptographers are dining together. At
the end of the dinner, each of them is secretly informed by the master whether he should pay the bill or not. So, either the
master will pay, or he will ask one of the cryptographers to pay. The cryptographers, or some external observer, would like
to find out whether the payer is one of them or the master. However, if the payer is one of them, they also wish to maintain
anonymity over the identity of the payer. Of course, we assume that the master himself will not reveal this information, and
also we want the solution to be distributed, i.e. communication can be achieved only via message passing, and there is no
central memory or central ‘coordinator’ which can be used to find out this information.
A possible solution to this problem, described in [11], is the following: Each cryptographer tosses a coin, which is visible
to himself and to the neighbor to his left. Each cryptographer then observes the two coins that he can see, and announces
agree or disagree. If a cryptographer is not paying, he will announce agree if the two sides are the same and disagree if they
3 The definition given here corresponds to that in [33]. In [30] the authors use a different (but equivalent) definition: they require ρ(S\C) ∼T S\C for
every permutation ρ in A.
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Fig. 2. Chaum’s protocol for the dining cryptographers [11,30].
are not. However, if he is paying then he will say the opposite. It can be proved that if the number of disagrees is even, then
the master is paying; otherwise, one of the cryptographers is paying. Furthermore, if one of the cryptographers is paying,
then neither an external observer nor the other two cryptographers can identify, from their individual information, who
exactly is paying.
The dining cryptographers’ problem will be a running example throughout the paper (Fig. 2).
3.1. Nondeterministic dining cryptographers
In the approach of [33,30] the dining cryptographers are formalized as a purely nondeterministic system: the coins are
approximated by nondeterministic coins, and the choice on who pays the bill is also nondeterministic.
The specification of the solution can be given in a process calculus style as illustrated below. In the original works [33,
30] the authors used CSP [18]. For the sake of uniformity here we use the pi-calculus [25]. We recall that + (∑) is the
nondeterministic sum and | (Π ) is the parallel composition. 0 is the empty process. τ is the silent (or internal) action. cm
and c(x) are, respectively, send and receive actions on channel c , where m is the message being transmitted and x is the
formal parameter. ν is an operator that, in the pi-calculus, has multiple purposes: it provides abstraction (hiding), enforces
synchronization, and generates new names. For more details on the pi-calculus and its semantics, we refer to Appendix A.1.
In the code below,⊕ and	 represent the sum and the subtraction modulo 3. Messages p and n sent by the master are
the requests to pay or to not pay, respectively. payi is the action of paying for cryptographer i.
We remark that we do not need all the expressive power of the pi-calculus for this program. In particular, we do not need
guarded choice (all the choices are internal because they start with τ ), and we do not need neither name-passing nor scope
extrusion, thus ν is used just like the restriction operator of CCS [24].
Master =∑2i=0 τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0+ τ .m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Crypt i = mi(x) . ci,i(y) . ci,i⊕1(z) .
if x = p
then payi . if y = z
then out idisagree
else out iagree
else if y = z
then out iagree
else out idisagree
Coini = τ .Headi + τ . Taili
Headi = c i,ihead . c i	1,ihead . 0
Taili = c i,itail . c i	1,itail . 0
Collect = out0(y0) . out1(y1) . out2(y2) . outall〈y0, y1, y2〉
DCP = (νEc)(ν Em)(ν Eout)(Master |∏i Crypt i |∏h Coinh | Collect).
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Fig. 3. Illustration of Example 1: the results that are observed with high frequency.
Let us consider the point of view of an external observer. The actions that are to be hidden (the set C) are the
communications of the decision of themaster and the results of the coins ( Em, Ec). These are already hidden in the definition of
the systemDCP . The anonymous users are of course the cryptographers, and the anonymous actions (the set A) is constituted
by the payi actions, for i = 0, 1, 2. The observable actions (the set B) is constituted by those of the form outall〈x0, x1, x2〉
with xi ∈ {agree, disagree}, for i = 0, 1, 2.
Let f be the function f (payi) = pay and f (α) = α for all the other actions. It is possible to check that f −1(f (DCP))) ∼T
DCP , where we recall that∼T stands for trace equivalence. Hence the nondeterministic notion of anonymity, as defined in
Section 2, is satisfied.
3.2. Limitations of the nondeterministic approach
As a consequence of approximating the coins by nondeterministic coins, we cannot differentiate between a fair coin and
a biased one. However, it is evident that the fairness of the coins is essential to ensure the anonymity property in the system,
as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1. Assume that, whenever a cryptographer pays, an external observer obtains almost always one of the three
outcomes represented in Fig. 3, where a stands for agree and d for disagree. More precisely, assume that these three outcomes
appear with a frequency of 33% each, while themissing configuration, d, a, a, appears with a frequency of only 1%.What can
the observer deduce?We note that Crypt1 and Crypt2 exhibit the same behavior while Crypt0 behaves differently. Hence, by
symmetry considerations (Coin0, Coin1 and Coin2 are opposite to Crypt1, Crypt2 and Crypt0 respectively) he can deduce that
Coin0 and Coin1 must be biased in the same way, and Coin2 must be biased differently. More precisely, Coin0 and Coin1 must
produce almost always head, and Coin2must produce almost always tail (or vice versa). From this estimation, it is immediate
to conclude that, in the first case, the payer is almost for sure Crypt1, in the second case Crypt2, and in the third case Crypt0.
In the situation illustrated in the above example, clearly, the system does not provide anonymity. However the
nondeterministic definition of anonymity is still satisfied (and it is satisfied in general, as long as ‘‘almost always’’ is not
‘‘always’’, i.e. the fourth configuration d, a, a also appears, from time to time). The problem is that the nondeterministic
definition can only express whether or not it is possible to have a particular outcome, but cannot express whether one
outcome is more likely than the other.
3.3. Probabilistic dining cryptographers
The probabilistic version of the protocol can be obtained from the nondeterministic one by attaching probabilities to the
coins.Wewish to remark that this is the essential changewith respect to [33,30]:we faithfullymodel the randommechanisms
of the protocol as probabilistic, rather than approximate them as nondeterministic.
Concerning the choices of the users (represented in this example as the choice of the master), those are in a sense
independent from the protocol, and can be either nondeterministic, or probabilistic, or both.
We use the probabilistic pi-calculus (pip) introduced in [17,27]. The essential difference with respect to the pi-calculus is
the presence of a probabilistic choice operator of the form∑
i
piαi.Pi
where the pi’s represents probabilities, i.e. they satisfy pi ∈ [0, 1] and∑i pi = 1, and the αi’s are non-output prefixes, i.e.
either input or silent prefixes. (Actually, for the purpose of this paper, only silent prefixes are used.) The detailed presentation
of this calculus is in Appendix A.2.
With respect to the program presented in Section 3.1, the definition of the Coini’s must be modified as follows (ph and pt
represent the probabilities of the outcomes of the coin tossing):
Coini = phτ .Headi + ptτ . Taili.
It is clear that the system obtained in this way combines probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior, not only because
the master may be nondeterministic, but also because the various components of the system and their internal interactions
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Fig. 4. A computation tree P and the fully probabilistic trees which derive from it under different schedulers. The irrelevant labels are omitted, and the
probability is omitted when it is 1.
can follow different scheduling policies, selected nondeterministically (although it can easily be seen that this latter form of
nondeterminism is not relevant for this particular protocol).
4. Probabilistic automata
The models of computation combining probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior are by now well established in
literature, see for instance the probabilistic automata of [34], and have been provided with solid mathematical foundations
and tools for verification.
By unfolding a probabilistic automaton we obtain a computation tree, whose nodes, in general, offer both probabilistic
and nondeterministic choices. In the probabilistic choices, the arcs are weighted with probabilities. The canonical way of
defining the probabilistic notions relevant for our work is the following: First we solve the nondeterminism, i.e. we choose
a function ς (called scheduler) which, for each nondeterministic choice in the computation tree, selects one of the possible
alternatives. After pruning the tree from all the nonselected alternatives, we obtain a fully probabilistic tree. In such a tree,
determined by ς , an execution (or run) is a maximal path, and an event is a (measurable) set of executions. In the finite case,
we define the probability of an execution as the product of all the weights in its arcs, and the probability of an event e, pς (e),
as the sum of the probabilities of the executions in e. For the infinite case, and for more details about the above notions, we
refer to Appendix A.2.
It should be clear, from the description above, that in general the probability of an event depends on the chosen scheduler.
For example, in Fig. 4 the tree P represents a computation tree. From its root there is a nondeterministic choice between
two transition groups (aka steps), which represent probabilistic choices. We adopt the convention of identifying a step by
drawing a curve across its transitions. Analogously, there is a nondeterministic choice between two steps in the fourth node
at the level immediately below the root. The trees Q , R and S represent the result of pruning P under different schedulers.
Let us denote these schedulers by ς , ϑ and ϕ respectively. The probability of the event b, under each of these schedulers, is:
pς (b) = 1/3+ 1/9 = 4/9, pϑ (b) = 1/2, and pϕ(b) = 0.
5. Our framework for probabilistic anonymity
In this section we illustrate the notions and assumptions which constitute the basis for our definition of probabilistic
anonymity.
The system inwhich the anonymous users live and operate ismodeled as a probabilistic automatonM [34], see Appendix
A.2. Like in Section 2, we classify the actions of M into the three sets A, B and C , which are determined by the anonymous
users, the specific kind of action on which we want anonymity, and the capabilities of the observer:
– The set of the anonymous actions:
A = {a(i) | i ∈ I}
where I is the set of the identities of the anonymous users and a is an injective function from I to the set of actions which
we call abstract action.
– The set of the visible actions, B. We will use b, b′, . . . to denote the elements of this set.
– The set of the hidden actions C .
In the following we assume that the actions in C are already restricted in the system, so we do not need to mention them
explicitly.
It should be remarked that the term ‘‘visible’’ here is relative: we assume that the observer can see only B and a, but, to
the purpose of defining anonymity and checking whether a system is anonymous, we need to leave the actions a(i)’s visible
(i.e. not restricted) as well.
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Differently from [33,30], we do not assume that the observables are necessarily the traces of visible actions. A trace,
indeed, contains not only the information on which actions have been executed, but also in what order they have been
executed. Now, the observer may or may not be able to detect the order, and this is important because the order may give
information on the culprit. Another reason for considering such abstraction is to make the analysis simpler. If we know, for
instance, that the order of the visible actions does not give any information about the culprit (for instance because we know
that the interleaving choices do not depend on the choice of the culprit) then we can forget about it.
In general, we abstract from the (visible) traces by assuming a partition O on them. The observables of the system are
then the elements of this partition, denoted by o, o′, . . .. Note that each of them is a set of traces.
Another difference from [33,30] is that we consider the possibility that only certain schedulers are allowed. Thus, our
notion of anonymity depends on the set of allowed schedulers, regarded as a parameter. One reason for this choice is to
make more efficient the verification of the anonymity property. If we know, for instance, that the interleavings do not give
any information about the culprit then we can fix one particular interleaving, thus reducing the number of schedulers to be
taken into account.
Definition 1. An anonymity system is a tuple (M, I, a,O, Z, p), where M is a probabilistic automaton, I is the set of
anonymous users, a is the abstract anonymous action, O is a set of observables, Z is a set of schedulers forM , and for every
ς ∈ Z , pς is a probabilitymeasure on the event space generated by the execution tree ofM under ς (denoted by etree(M, ς)),
i.e. the σ–field generated by the cones in etree(M, ς) (cfr. Appendix A.2).
Note that, as expressed by the above definition, given a scheduler ς , an event is a set of executions in etree(M, ς). We
introduce the following notation to represent the events of interest:
– a(i) : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing the action a(i)
– a : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an action a(i) for an arbitrary i
– o : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an element of o.
We use the symbols∪,∩ and¬ to represent the union, the intersection, and the complement of events, respectively. By the
definition of a, we have
a =
⋃
i∈I
a(i).
Furthermore, by the definition of O, all the observables are pairwise disjoint:
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o1, o2 ∈ O. o1 6= o2 ⇒ pς (o1 ∪ o2) = pς (o1)+ pς (o2) (1)
and they cover all possible traces:
∀ς ∈ Z . pς
(⋃
o∈O
o
)
= 1. (2)
In this paper we assume there is at most one culprit per run. In other words, we assume that all the a(i)’s are pairwise
disjoint. This assumption is fundamental for the notion of anonymity we propose, and for the results we obtain.
Assumption 1 (At Most One Culprit).
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i, j ∈ I. i 6= j⇒ pς (a(i) ∪ a(j)) = pς (a(i))+ pς (a(j)).
6. Probabilistic anonymity for users with probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior
In this section we develop a notion of anonymity for the general case in which also the users, besides the protocol,
combine probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior.
Example 2. An example of such a kind of behavior in the dining cryptographers is the following: assume that the master
may have a different attitude depending on the group of cryptographers that meet for dinner. Say that there are two groups,
and which of them will meet for dinner is decided nondeterministically. The master will select the payer with probabilities
p0, . . . , p3 in the case of the first group, and q0, . . . , q3 in the case of the second. Note that this situation may be quite
common in practice: a certain protocol may be used by different groups of users, whichmay act probabilistically, but whose
probability distribution may vary from one group to the other.
Such a master can be represented in pip as follows:
Master = τ .Master1 + τ .Master2
Master1 =
2∑
i=0
pi τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0+ p3τ .m0n .m1n .m2n . 0
Master2 =
2∑
i=0
qi τ .mip .mi⊕1n .mi⊕2n . 0+ q3τ .m0n .m1n .m2n . 0.
Note that the choice inMaster is nondeterministic while the choices inMaster1 andMaster2 are probabilistic.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of Example 3.
The notion of anonymity must take into account the probabilities of the a(i)’s. When we observe a certain event o, the
probability of o having been induced by a(i) must be the same as the probability of o having been induced by a(j) for any
other j ∈ I . To formalize this notion, we need the concept of conditional probability. Recall that, given two events x and y
with p(y) > 0, the conditional probability of x given y, denoted by p(x | y), is equal to the probability of x and y, divided by
the probability of y:
p(x | y) = p(x ∩ y)
p(y)
.
We are now ready to propose our notion of anonymity:
Definition 2 (Probabilistic Anonymity for Users with Probabilistic and Nondeterministic Behavior). A system (M, I, a,O, Z, p)
is anonymous if
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (pς (a(i)) > 0 ∧ pϑ (a(j)) > 0)⇒ pς (o | a(i)) = pϑ (o | a(j)).
Example 3. Consider the system in Example 2. Assume that the coins are totally fair. For simplicity, let us fix the order of
execution of the various components (interleaving),4 so that the only nondeterministic choice is the choice of the master.
Hence we have Z = {ς, ϑ} where ς and ϑ select Master1 and Master2 respectively. Assume now that Master1 and
Master2 select as the payers i ∈ I with probability pi and j ∈ I with probability qj, respectively. The possible observable
events, in both cases, are o0 = 〈a, a, d〉, o1 = 〈a, d, a〉, o2 = 〈d, a, a〉, and o3 = 〈d, d, d〉. These are the results in case
one of the cryptographers is the payer. The case in which none of them is the payer gives the 4 configurations with an
even number of d, which we will indicate by o4, . . . , o7. Consider now the possible outcomes of the coins. These are 8:
〈h, h, h〉, 〈h, h, t〉, . . . , 〈t, t, t〉. It is easy to see that, independently fromwhich cryptographer is the payer, each of the above
observables is produced by exactly two configurations. If the coins are fair, then, independently from the probability of
the selected cryptographer, each observable o corresponds to a cone in the tree (rooted in the node immediately after the
selection of the cryptographer) which has probabilistic measure 1/4 (cfr Fig. 5). Therefore pς (o | a(i)) = 1/4 = pϑ (o | a(j)).
Hence Definition 2 is satisfied.
The behavior of a master which combines nondeterministic and probabilistic behavior can be much more complicated
than the one illustrated above. However it is easy to see, by following the reasoning in the example above, that as long as
the master does not influence the behavior of the coins, and these are fair, the conditional probability of each observable for
a given payer is 1/4.
Proposition 1. Consider the dining cryptographers with arbitrary master (possibly combining nondeterminism and probability).
If the coins are fair under every scheduler, then the system is probabilistically anonymous.
The proof of the above proposition is a straightforward generalization of the Example 3.
Example 4. Consider again the system in Example 2, but assume now that the coins are biased. Say, Coin0 and Coin1 give
headwith probability 9/10 and tailwith probability 1/10, and vice versa Coin2 gives headwith probability 1/10 and tailwith
probability 9/10. (This situation is analogous to that illustrated in Example 1.) Let us consider the observable o0 = 〈a, a, d〉.
In case Crypt1 is the payer, then the probability to get o0 is equal to the probability that the result of the coins is 〈h, h, t〉, plus
the probability that the result of the coins is 〈t, t, h〉, which is r = 9/10∗9/10∗9/10+1/10∗1/10∗1/10 = 730/1000. In
4 It is easy to see that, for this example, it does not matter which interleaving we consider.
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Fig. 6. Illustration of Example 4.
case Crypt2 is the payer, then the probability to get 〈a, a, d〉 is equal to the probability that the result of the coins is 〈h, h, h〉,
plus the probability that the result of the coins is 〈t, t, t〉, which is s = 9/10∗9/10∗1/10+1/10∗1/10∗9/10 = 90/1000.
It is easy to see that the same probability holds for the other cryptographers. Fig. 6 illustrates the situation. The observables
o1, . . . , o3 are as before, o6 is 〈a, d, d〉.
Hence, in the biased case, Definition 3 is not satisfied. And this is what we expect, because the system, intuitively, is not
anonymous: when we observe 〈a, a, d〉, Crypt1 is much more likely to be the payer than any of the others.
6.1. Independence from the probability distribution of the users
One important property of Definition 2 is that it is independent from the probability distribution of the users. Intuitively,
this is due to the fact that the condition of anonymity simply means that the cones for o rooted in the nodes that result from
the (probabilistic and/or nondeterministic) selection of the culprit, have the same probabilistic measure, and this measure
is independent from the probability of the culprit.
We consider this property fundamental for a good notion of anonymity: An anonymity protocol, in fact, should guarantee
anonymity independently from (the attitude of) the users who use it, as long as they follow the protocol.
Theorem 1. If (M, I, a,O, Z, p) is anonymous then for any p′ which differs from p only on the a(i)’s, (M, I, a,O, Z, p′) is
anonymous.
Proof. Assume that (M, I, a,O, Z, p) is anonymous. Consider a scheduler ς ∈ Z . It is sufficient to show that for every o ∈ O
and every i ∈ I , pς (o|a(i)) = p′ς (o|a(i)), or equivalently
pς (o ∩ a(i))
pς (a(i))
= p
′
ς (o ∩ a(i))
p′ς (a(i))
.
Assume that the choice of the a(j)′s is the first choice in etree(M, ς). If this is not the case, then we can transform the tree
into one which satisfy this assumption, and in which the probability of events is the same. Fig. 7 shows the basic step of
this transformation, in the case c is an anonymous action. In case c is an observable action, then in the second tree c and
the rightmost bmust be switched in order to preserve the order in the trace (in case such order is observable). LetΞ be the
set of runs whose visible traces are of the form a(i).b1.b2. . . . .bk for b1.b2. . . . .bk ∈ o. We have that pς (o ∩ a(i)) = pς (Ξ).
Observe now that pς (Ξ) = pς (a(i))pς (Ξ ′), where Ξ ′ is the set of suffixes of the runs that start at the node resulting from
the choice of a(i). Hence we have pς (o ∩ a(i)) = pς (a(i))pς (Ξ ′). Analogously, p′ς (o ∩ a(i)) = p′ς (a(i))p′ς (Ξ ′). But, because
of the hypothesis that pς and p′ς only differ on the a(i)′s, we have pς (Ξ ′) = p′ς (Ξ ′), which concludes the proof. 
6.2. Alternative characterization
We give here an alternative characterization of the notion of anonymity. The idea is that a system is anonymous if the
probability, under a certain scheduler, of an observable o, given a(i), is the same as the probability of o given a under every
other scheduler.
Proposition 2. A system (M, I, a,O, Z, p) is anonymous iff
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (pς (a(i)) > 0 ∧ pϑ (a) > 0)⇒ pς (o | a(i)) = pϑ (o | a).
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Fig. 7. Basic transformation step for the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. (If part) Let ς, ϑ ∈ Z and i, j ∈ I such that pς (a(i)) > 0 and pϑ (a(j)) > 0. Since pϑ (a(j)) > 0 implies pϑ (a) > 0, by
the hypothesis we have pς (o | a(i)) = pϑ (o | a). Furthermore, by replacing in the hypothesis ς with ϑ and iwith j
we have pϑ (o | a(j)) = pϑ (o | a).
(Only if part) Let ς, ϑ ∈ Z and i ∈ I such that pς (a(i)) > 0 and pϑ (a) > 0.
pϑ (o ∩ a) = pϑ
(
o
⋂⋃
j∈I
a(j)
)
= pϑ
(⋃
j∈I
(
o
⋂
a(j)
))
=
∑
j∈I
pϑ
(
o
⋂
a(j)
)
(by Assumption 1)
=
∑
pϑ (a(j))>0
pϑ
(
o
⋂
a(j)
)
=
∑
pϑ (a(j))>0
pϑ (o | a(j)) pϑ (a(j))
= pς (o | a(i))
∑
pϑ (a(j))>0
pϑ (a(j)) (by Definition 2)
= pς (o | a(i)) pϑ (a).
Hence pϑ (o | a) = pϑ (o ∩ a)/pϑ (a) = pς (o | a(i)). 
7. Probabilistic anonymity for nondeterministic users
The case in which the users are purely nondeterministic is characterized by the fact that each scheduler determines
completely whether an action of the form a(i) takes place or not. Formally:
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. pς (a(i)) = 0 ∨ pς (a(i)) = 1. (3)
In the case of nondeterministic users, the definition of anonymity simplifies as follows:
Proposition 3. A system (M, I, a,O, Z, p) in which the choice of a(i) (for i ∈ I) is nondeterministic in each run, is anonymous if
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. pς (a) = pϑ (a) = 1⇒ pς (o) = pϑ (o).
Proof. Immediate by instantiating Definition 2 to the case in which (3) holds, and by observing that, if pς (a(i)) = 1, then
pς (o | a(i)) = pς (o). 
8. Probabilistic anonymity for fully probabilistic systems
In this section we investigate how the removal of the nondeterminism influences our definition of anonymity. We
consider therefore purely probabilistic systems. This will allow us also to compare our notion with other probabilistic
proposals in literature.
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Since the system is totally probabilistic, the probability measures do not depend on the choice of the scheduler. To be
more precise, there is only one scheduler. So we can eliminate the component Z from the tuple and we can write p(x)
instead of pς (x). The definition of probabilistic anonymity given in the previous section (cfr. Definition 2) simplifies into the
following:
Definition 3. A fully probabilistic system (M, I, a,O, p) is anonymous if
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0)⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j)).
Furthermore, the alternative characterization in Proposition 2 reduces to the following:
Proposition 4. A fully probabilistic system (M, I, a,O, p) is anonymous iff
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(a(i)) > 0 ⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a).
In the fully probabilistic case there are two other notions of anonymity that seem rather natural. The first is based on the
intuition that a system is anonymous if the observations do not change the probability of a(i). The probability of a(i) before
the observation is called a priori probability; the probability of a(i) after the observation is called a posteriori probability. So
the intuition is that a protocol does not leak information if these probabilities coincide. This is already known in literature as
conditional anonymity (cfr. [16]). It is interesting to point out the link with Information Theory: the conditionmeans, indeed,
that the entropy of the random variable associated to the culprit remains the same after the observation; i.e. the observation
does not increase the information about the culprit.
The second notion is based on the (similar) idea that observing o rather than o′ should not change our knowledge of the
probability of a(i).
It is possible to prove that these two notions are equivalent. Furthermore, if we assume that the action a (i.e. the existence
of a culprit) is totally visible to the observer, then we can prove that these notions are equivalent to ours. The condition ‘‘a
is totally visible’’ means that every observable o indicates unambiguously whether a has taken place or not, i.e. it either
implies a, or it implies¬a. In other words this means that either o (as a set) is contained in a (as a set) or in the complement
of a. Formally:
Assumption 2 (The Existence of a Culprit is Observable).
∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) = p(o) ∨ p(o ∩ ¬a) = p(o).
We prove now our claims of equivalence.
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 2, the following conditions are equivalent to each other and to our condition of anonymity.
(i) ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a)
(ii) ∀i ∈ I. ∀o, o′ ∈ O. (p(o ∩ a) > 0 ∧ p(o′ ∩ a) > 0) ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | o′).
Proof. We first show the equivalence of (i) and our condition of anonymity, using Proposition 4.
Assume (i) and p(a(i)) > 0. If p(o ∩ a) = 0 then p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a) = 0. Otherwise,
p(o | a(i)) = p(a(i) | o) p(o)p(a(i))
= p(a(i)) p(o)p(a) p(a(i)) (by (i))
= p(o)p(a)
= p(o ∩ a)p(a) (by Assumption 2)
= p(o | a).
Vice versa, assume that the condition in Proposition 4holds, and p(o∩a) > 0. If p(a(i)) = 0, then p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a) =
0. Otherwise we derive p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a) from p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a), essentially reverting the above derivation.
As for the equivalence of (i) and (ii), we have:
(i)⇒ (ii) Let i ∈ I , and o, o′ ∈ O such that p(o ∩ a) > 0 and p(o′ ∩ a) > 0. By (i) we have p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a) =
p(a(i) | o′).
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Fig. 8. Illustration of Example 5.
(ii)⇒ (i) Let i ∈ I and o ∈ O such that p(o ∩ a) > 0. We have
p(a(i)) = p
(
a(i)
⋂⋃
o′∈O
o′
)
(by (2))
= p
(⋃
o′∈O
(
a(i)
⋂
o′
))
=
∑
o′∈O
p
(
a(i)
⋂
o′
)
(by (1))
=
∑
p
(
o′
⋂
a
)
>0
p
(
a(i)
⋂
o′
)
=
∑
p
(
o′
⋂
a
)
>0
p(a(i) | o′) p(o′)
= p(a(i) | o)
∑
p
(
o′
⋂
a
)
>0
p(o′) (by (ii))
= p(a(i) | o) p(a) (by (2) and Assumption 2). 
Proposition 5 is based on general properties of probabilistic spaces, independently from the particular setting (in our
case, probabilistic automata) which we use to define the probabilities. Similar results have been presented in [15] and in
[14] (for the case in which a always occurs, i.e. p(a) = 1).
Since the notion of conditional anonymity (as well as the other notion in Proposition 5) is equivalent to ours, we have
that also these notions are independent from the probability of the users. On the other hand, one has to keep in mind that
the correspondence only holds under the Assumptions 1 (only one culprit) and 2 (the existence of a culprit is observable).
Without Assumption 2 conditional anonymity is not independent from the probabilities of the users. Without Assumption 1
neither conditional anonymity nor our notion is independent.
Example 5. Fig. 8 shows an example in which Assumption 2 does not hold, and conditional anonymity depends on the
probability of the users. In fact the first tree satisfies conditional anonymity, while the second does not. (They both satisfy
our notion of anonymity.)
Example 6. Fig. 9 shows an example in which Assumption 1 does not hold, and both conditional anonymity and our notion
of anonymity depend on the probability of the users. In fact the first tree satisfies both kinds of anonymity, while the second
does not.
9. Conditional anonymity and nondeterminism
It is not clear whether conditional anonymity [16] can be generalized to the case of the users with nondeterministic
behavior. The ‘‘naive’’ extensions obtained by introducing the scheduler in the formulae would not work. Let us consider the
first characterization, i.e. conditional anonymity (for the other we would follow an analogous reasoning):
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i))/p(a).
One possible way of reintroducing the notion of scheduler is
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (pς (o ∩ a) > 0 ∧ pϑ (a) > 0)⇒ pς (a(i) | o) = pϑ (a(i))/pϑ (a).
However this condition is too strong because it implies that pϑ (a(i))/pϑ (a) is the same for every ϑ , and this is clearly not
the case for instance for the nondeterministic and probabilistic master specified in Section 2.
On the other hand, if we weaken the condition by identifying ς and ϑ:
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Fig. 9. Illustration of Example 6.
∀ς ∈ Z . ∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. pς (o ∩ a) > 0⇒ pς (a(i) | o) = pς (a(i))/pς (a)
then the condition would be too weak to ensure anonymity, as shown by the following example:
Example 7. Consider a system in which the master influences the behavior of the coins somehow, in such a way that
when Crypti is chosen as the payer (say, purely nondeterministically, by ςi) the result is always o0 = 〈d, a, a〉 for i = 0,
o1 = 〈a, d, a〉 for i = 1, and o2 = 〈a, a, d〉 for i = 2. Then we would have pςi(oj ∩ a) > 0 only if j = i, and pςi(a(i)| oi) = 1 = pςi(a(i))/pςi(a). Hence the above condition would be satisfied, but the system would not be anonymous at all:
whenever we observe 〈d, a, a〉, for instance, we are sure that Crypt0 is the payer.
10. Toward an automatic probabilistic checker
Wehave formulated the notion of anonymity in terms of observables for processes in the probabilisticpi-calculus, whose
semantics is based on the probabilistic automata of [34]. This opens the way to the automatic verification of the property.
It is worth noting that existing probabilistic model checkers, like PRISM, cannot be used directly to prove anonymity. In
fact, PRISM computes only the infimum and the supremumof the probabilities of a given formulawith respect to all possible
schedulers. The anonymity property, on the contrary, requires computing the exact probability for each scheduler.
We are currently developing a model checker using the probabilistic pi-calculus. In order to achieve this goal, several
practical issues have to be fixed. This is part of the Ph.D. thesis of Romain Beauxis.
An automatic checker for our probabilistic notion of anonymity needs a full evaluation of the execution. This differs from
the model checkers, where the process is checked against a single property. In our case, we want to collect all the various
outcomes of the protocol and relate them to the inputs.
The natural language for an implementation is the asynchronous version of the pi-calculus. In the asynchronous variant
of the pi-calculus, only internal (blind) choice is allowed and message sending is limited. The sending construct of the
synchronous language, xy.P is replaced by an atomic sending process xy. In [4], this limitation is shown to be equivalent
to using an unordered buffered communication medium.
A process in the asynchronous pi-calculus cannot naively send a message and wait until it is received to continue its
execution. Encodings exist that mostly consist in an acknowledgment of the reception, much like for the TCP protocol.
For a majority of applications, the asynchronous pi-calculus is the natural language for expressing a protocol or
an algorithm, since most real-life communications and modern electronic networks use asynchronous communication
mediums. For instance, the implementation of the the dining cryptographers proposed in this paper is purely asynchronous.
However, asynchronous communications imply algorithmic limitations, such as for implementing a distributed consensus,
as studied in [26].
A naive evaluation of the probabilistic executions can be very inefficient. When communicating asynchronously, most
communications happen without a particular order. This generates interleavings, where several sequence of actions can be
observed in any order, but the overall result is the same. When evaluating this kind of executions, it is much more efficient
to constrain the evaluation to only one of these possible interleavings. This leads to the definition of restricted executions
that we call focused.
Such focused evaluations have beenproved tomaintain all relevant information on the evaluatedprocess. Themay testing
semantics is equivalent on focused and original executions. Furthermore, two bisimilar processes for the focused executions
are bisimilar for the original executions. The implementation of such focused evaluator for the asynchronous pi-calculus is
currently under development.
11. Related work
The work [19] presents a modular framework to formalize a range of properties (including numerous flavors
anonymity and privacy) of computer systems in which an observer has only partial information about system behavior,
thereby combining the benefits of the knowledge-based approach (natural specification of information-hiding) and the
algebra-based approach (natural specification of system behavior). It proposes the notion of function view to represent a
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mathematical abstraction of partial knowledge of a function. The logical formulae describing a property are characterized as
opaqueness of certain function views, converted into predicates over observational equivalence classes, and verified, when
possible, using the proof techniques of the chosen process formalism.
In [16,37] epistemic logic is used to characterize a number of information-hiding requirements (including anonymity).
In particular, [37] introduces the notion of a group principal and an associated model, language and logic to axiomatize
anonymity. The main advantage of modal logic is that even fairly complex properties can be stated directly as formulae in
the logic. On the other hand, [16] uses a completely semantic approach and provides an appropriate semantic framework
in which to consider anonymity. It also propose notions of probabilistic anonymity in a purely probabilistic framework.
In particular, it propose a notion of conditional probability (cfr. Definition 4.4 in [16]) which is similar to the first
characterization in Proposition 5, if we interpret the formula ϕ in [16] as the occurrence of the event a. Another notion
defined in [16] is that of (strong) Probabilistic Anonymity, which is expressed as the requirement that the a posteriori
probabilities of two different anonymous events are the same under every observable, i.e.
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(j) | o).
This condition seems quite natural at a first sight; however a more careful analysis reveals that it is too strong. In [4] it was
indeed proved (see also Appendix A.3) that it is equivalent to our notion of anonymity (for fully probabilistic users) plus the
condition that the a priori probabilities of two anonymous events are the same, namely:
∀i, j ∈ I. p(a(i)) = p(a(j)).
So Probabilistic Anonymity in the sense of [16] requires a uniform distribution on the anonymous events, which, in our
opinion, is too much of a restriction for the users.
The first characterization in Proposition 5 was also implicitly used by Chaum in [11] (in which he considered a purely
probabilistic system) as the definition of anonymity. The factor p(a) is not present in the formula of Chaum, but that may be
a typo, because in the informal explanation he gives, that factor is taken into account.
In literature there have been other works involving the use of variants of the pi-calculus for formalizing protocols
providing anonymity or similar properties. See for example [1,20].
The research on the probabilistic foundations of anonymity (and more in general, information-hiding, and the related
field of information flow) has recently evolved towards the use of Information Theory [13,35,22,9,23] andHypothesis Testing
[10,36]. The advantage in the use of these frameworks is that they allow to define quantitative degrees of anonymity. On
the other hand, these frameworks are purely probabilistic, i.e. assume that the behavior of the user is probabilistic, and do
not consider the existence of internal nondeterminism in the protocol.
With respect to the protocol’s nondeterminism, our definition of anonymity is quite strict, because it requires that there is
no leakage of information under any scheduler. But in themajority of cases, we can define a scheduler that follows a different
policy depending on the choice of the anonymous event, thus leaking the information about the anonymous event. In the
case of our example of the Dining Cryptographers we do not have such problem, but we would have it if the declarations of
the cryptographers were observed as a sequence instead of a tuple. In fact, the scheduler could for instance always schedule
the declaration of the payer at last, thus revealing entirely who the payer is. The problem of the scheduler in security, and a
proposal for its solution, are discussed in [8,7].
12. Conclusion and future work
We have proposed a notion of anonymity based on a model which combines probability and nondeterminism, and we
have shown that under certain assumptions it can be regarded as a generalization of conditional anonymity [16].
We have formulated the notion of anonymity in terms of observables for processes in the probabilisticpi-calculus, whose
semantics is based on the probabilistic automata of [34]. This opens the way to the automatic verification of the property.
We are currently developing a model checker for the probabilistic pi-calculus.
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Appendix
A.1. The pi-calculus
We recall here the basic notions about the pi-calculus. We choose the variant used in [6,31], which differs from the
standard one because it has a guarded choice instead of the free choice. This is convenient because it will allow to introduce
the probabilistic pi-calculus, in the next section, in a smoother way.
Let N be a countable set of names, x, y, . . .. The set of prefixes, α, β, . . ., and the set of pi-calculus processes, P,Q , . . .,
are defined by the following abstract syntax:
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Prefixes α ::= x(y) | x¯y | τ
Processes P ::=∑i αi.Pi | νxP | P|P| ! P | [x = y] P | [x 6= y] P.
Prefixes represent the basic actions of processes: x(y) is the input of the (formal) name y from channel x; x¯y is the output
of the name y on channel x; τ stands for any silent (non-communication) action.
The process
∑
i αi.Pi represents guarded (global) choice and it is usually assumed to be finite. We will use the
abbreviations 0 (inaction) to represent the empty sum, α.P (prefix) to represent sum on one element only, and P +Q for the
binary sum. The symbols νx, |, and ! are the restriction, the parallel, and the replication operator, respectively.
To indicate the structure of a process expression we will use the following conventions: P0 | P1 | P2 | . . . | Pk−1 stands for
(. . . ((P0 | P1) | P2) | . . . | Pk−1), i.e. the parallel operator is left associative, and α1.P1 |α2.P2 stands for (α1.P1)|(α2.P2), i.e. the
prefix operator has precedence over |. In all other cases of ambiguity we will use parentheses.
The operators νx and y(x) are x-binders, i.e. in the processes νxP and y(x).P the occurrences of x in P are considered bound,
with the usual rules of scoping. The set of the free names of P , i.e. those names which do not occur in the scope of any binder,
is denoted by fn(P). The alpha-conversion of bound names is defined as usual, and the renaming (or substitution) P{y/x} is
defined as the result of replacing all occurrences of x in P by y, possibly applying alpha-conversion to avoid capture.
In the paper we use also the construct
if x = y then P else Q .
This expression is syntactic sugar standing for the process [x = y] P | [x 6= y]Q .
The operational semantics is specified via a transition system labeled by actionsµ,µ′ . . .. These are given by the following
grammar:
Actions µ ::= xy | x¯y | x¯(y) | τ .
Action xy corresponds to the input prefix x(z), where the formal parameter z is instantiated to the actual parameter y (see
Rule I-Sum in Table 1). Action x¯y correspond to the output of a free name. The bound output x¯(y) is introduced tomodel scope
extrusion, i.e. the result of sending to another process a private (ν-bound) name. The bound names of an action µ, bn(µ),
are defined as follows: bn(x¯(y)) = {y}; bn(xy) = bn(x¯y) = bn(τ ) = ∅. Furthermore, we will indicate by n(µ) all the names
which occur in µ.
In the literature there are two definitions for the transition system of the pi-calculus which induce the so-called early and
late bisimulation semantics respectively. Here we choose to present the first one. There is no difference between the two
for the purposes of our paper.
The rules for the early semantics are given in Table 1. The symbol≡ used in Rule Cong stands for structural congruence,
a form of equivalence which identifies ‘‘statically’’ two processes. Again, there are several definitions for this relation in
literature. For our purposes we do not need a very rich notion, we will just use it to simplify the presentation. Hence we
only assume this congruence to satisfy the following:
(i) P ≡ Q if Q can be obtained from P by alpha-renaming, notation P ≡α Q ,
(ii) P|Q ≡ Q |P ,
(iii) (P|Q )|R ≡ P|(Q |R),
(iv) (νxP)|Q ≡ νx(P|Q ) if x 6∈ fv(Q ),
(v) ! P ≡ P | ! P ,
(vi) [x = x] P ≡ P ,
(vii) [x 6= y] P ≡ P , if x is syntactically different from y.
A.2. The probabilistic pi-calculus
In this section we recall the definition of the probabilistic pi-calculus, pip, which was introduced in [17]. This calculus
was used in [27] to express various randomized algorithms, notably the distributed implementation of the pi-calculus with
mixed choice. In this paper, we are going to use it as a formalism to express systems of probabilistic anonymous agents.
A.2.1. Probabilistic automata
The pip-calculus is based on the model of probabilistic automata of Segala and Lynch [34], which are able to express both
probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors.
A discrete probabilistic space is a pair (X, p) where X is a finite or countable set and p is a function p : X → (0, 1] such
that
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1. Given a set Y , we define the sets of all probabilistic spaces on Y as
Prob(Y ) = {(X, p) |X ⊆ Y and (X, p) is a discrete probabilistic space}.
Given a set of states S and a set of actions A, a probabilistic automaton on S and A is a triple (S, T , s0)where s0 ∈ S (initial
state) and T ⊆ S×Prob(A×S).We call the elements of T transition groups (in [34] they are called steps). The idea behind this
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Table 1
The transition system of the pi-calculus.
I-Sum
∑
i αi.Pi
x(z)−→ Pj[z/y] αj = x(y)
O/τ -Sum
∑
i αi.Pi
αj−→ Pj αj = x¯y or αj = τ
Open
P
x¯y−→ P ′
νyP
x¯(y)−→ P ′
x 6= y
Res
P
µ−→ P ′
νyP
µ−→ νyP ′
y 6∈ n(µ)
Par
P
µ−→ P ′
P|Q µ−→ P ′|Q
bn(µ) ∩ fn(Q ) = ∅
Com
P
x(y)−→ P ′ Q x¯y−→ Q ′
P|Q τ−→ P ′|Q ′
Close
P
x(y)−→ P ′ Q x¯(y)−→ Q ′
P|Q τ−→ νy(P ′|Q ′)
Cong
P ≡ P ′ P ′ µ−→ Q ′ Q ′ ≡ Q
P
µ−→ Q
model is that the choice between two different groups is made nondeterministically and possibly controlled by an external
agent, e.g. a scheduler, while the transition within the same group is chosen probabilistically and it is controlled internally
(e.g. by a probabilistic choice operator). An automaton in which there is at most one transition group for each state is called
fully probabilistic.
We define now the notion of execution of an automaton under a scheduler, by adapting and simplifying the corresponding
notion given in [34]. A scheduler can be seen as a function that solves the nondeterminism of the automaton by selecting,
at each moment of the computation, a transition group among all the ones allowed in the present state. Schedulers are
sometimes called adversaries, thus conveying the idea of an external entity playing ‘‘against’’ the process. For the purpose
of this paper, however, we stick to the term ‘‘scheduler’’ in order to avoid confusion with the notion of adversary used in
security. We will assume that a scheduler can decide the next transition group depending not only on the current state, but
also on the whole history of the computation till that moment, including the random choices made by the automaton.
Given a probabilistic automatonM = (S, T , s0), define tree(M) as the tree obtained by unfolding the transition system,
i.e. the tree with a root n0 labeled by s0, and such that, for each node n, if s ∈ S is the label of n, then for each (s, (X, p)) ∈ T ,
and for each (µ, s′) ∈ X , there is a node n′ child of n labeled by s′, and the arc from n to n′ is labeled by µ and p(µ, s′). We
will denote by nodes(M) the set of nodes in tree(M), and by state(n) the state labeling a node n.
A scheduler for M is a function ς that associates to each node n of tree(M) a transition group among those which are
allowed in state(n). More formally, ς : nodes(M)→ Prob(A× S) such that ς(n) = (X, p) implies (state(n), (X, p)) ∈ T .
The execution tree of an automaton M = (S, T , s0) under a scheduler ς , denoted by etree(M, ς), is the tree obtained
from tree(M) by pruning all the arcs corresponding to transitions which are not in the group selected by ς . More formally,
etree(M, ς) is a fully probabilistic automaton (S ′, T ′, n0), where S ′ ⊆ nodes(M), n0 is the root of tree(M), and (n, (X ′, p′)) ∈
T ′ iff X ′ = {(µ, n′) | (µ, state(n′)) ∈ X and n′ is a child of n in tree(M)} and p′(µ, n′) = p(µ, state(n′)), where (X, p) =
ς(n). If (n, (X ′, p′)) ∈ T ′, (µ, n′) ∈ X ′, and p′(µ, n′) = p, we will use sometime the notation n µ−→
p
n′.
An execution fragment ξ is any path (finite or infinite) from the root of etree(M, ς). The notation ξ ≤ ξ ′ means that ξ is a
prefix of ξ ′. If ξ is n0
µ0−→
p0
n1
µ1−→
p1
n2
µ2−→
p2
. . ., the probability of ξ is defined as p(ξ) =∏i pi. If ξ is maximal, then it is called
execution. We denote by exec(M, ς) the set of all executions in etree(M, ς).
We define now a probability on certain sets of executions, following a standard construction of Measure Theory. Given
an execution fragment ξ , let Cξ = {ξ ′ ∈ exec(M, ς) | ξ ≤ ξ ′} (cone with prefix ξ ). Define p(Cξ ) = p(ξ). Let {Ci}i∈I be a
countable set of disjoint cones (i.e. I is countable, and ∀i, j. i 6= j⇒ Ci ∩ Cj = ∅). Then define p(⋃i∈I Ci) =∑i∈I p(Ci). Two
countable sets of disjoint cones with the same union produce the same result for p, so p is well defined. Further, we define
the probability of an empty set of executions as 0, and the probability of the complement of a certain set of executions, with
respect to all the executions as the complement with respect to 1 of the probability of the set. The closure of the cones (plus
the empty set) under countable unions and complementation generates what in Measure Theory is known as a σ -field.
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A.2.2. Syntax and transition system of the pip-calculus
We will now illustrate the pip-calculus. Syntactically, the only difference with respect to the pi-calculus is that we
do not have the free choice (or mixed guarded choice depending on the presentation), and we have instead the output
prefix
x¯y.P
and the following probabilistic non-output choice operator∑
i
piαi.Pi
where the pi’s represents positive probabilities, i.e. they satisfy pi ∈ (0, 1] and∑i pi = 1, and the αi’s are non-output
prefixes, i.e. either input or silent prefixes.
Note that the nondeterministic blind choice τ .P + τ .Q can be obtained in this calculus by using the parallel operator: it
is in fact equivalent to (νx)(x¯ ‖ x.P ‖ x.Q ).
In order to give the formal definition of the probabilisticmodel forpip, it is convenient to introduce the following notation:
given a probabilistic automaton (S, T , s0) and s ∈ S, we write
s
{
µi−→
pi
si | i ∈ I
}
iff (s, ({(µi, si) | i ∈ I}, p)) ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I pi = p(µi, si), where I is an index set. When I is not relevant, we will use the
simpler notation s { µi−→
pi
si}i. We will also use the notation s { µi−→
pi
si}i:φ(i), where φ(i) is a logical formula depending on i, for
the set s { µi−→
pi
si | i ∈ I and φ(i)}.
The operational semantics of a pip process P is a probabilistic automaton whose states are the processes reachable from
P and the T relation is defined by the rules in Table 2.
The following is an informal explanation of the rules in Table 2.
Sum: This rule models the behavior of a choice process: each transition corresponds to the possible execution of an
enabled guard αi and the consequent commitment to the branch Pi. Note that all possible transitions belong to the
same group, meaning that the transition is chosen probabilistically by the process itself.
Out: This rule expresses the fact that an output prefix process α.P simply performs the action, and then continues
with P .
Res: This rule models restriction on channel y: only the actions on channels different from y can be performed and
possibly synchronize with an external process. The probability is redistributed among these actions.
Open: This rule works in combination with Close by signaling that the send action labeling the transition is on a name
which is private to the sender.
Par: This rule represents the interleaving of parallel processes. All the transitions of the processes involved are made
possible, and they are kept separated in the original groups. In this way we model the fact that the selection of
the process for the next computation step is determined by a scheduler. In fact, choosing a group corresponds to
choosing a process.
Com: This rule models communication by handshaking. The output action synchronizes with all matching input actions
of a partner, with the same probability of the input action. The other possible transitions of the partner are kept
with the original probability as well. Note that the side condition ensure that all matching inputs are considered.
Thanks to alpha-conversion, we can always rewrite a process so that this condition is met.
Close: This rule is analogous to Com, the only difference is that the name being transmitted is private (local) to the
sender.
Cong: This rule says that structurally equivalent processes perform the same transitions.
A.3. Relation between notions of anonymity for probabilistic users
In this appendix we prove the claim we made in Section 11 (and already proved in [4]), namely that the notion of
probabilistic anonymity of Halpern and O’Neil (cfr. Definition 4.4 in [16]), i.e.
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(j) | o) (4)
is equivalent to our notion of anonymity (for fully probabilistic users) plus the condition that the a priori probabilities of two
anonymous events are the same, that is:
∀i, j ∈ I. p(a(i)) = p(a(j)). (5)
In order to prove the above claim, let us recall our definition of anonymity as given in Definition 3:
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0)⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j)). (6)
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Table 2
The probabilistic transition system of the pip-calculus.
Sum
∑
i piαi.Pi
{
xi(zi)−→
pi
P ′i
}
i
αi = xi(yi) and P ′i = Pi[zi/yi] or
αi = τ and P ′i = Pi
Out xy.P
{
xy−→
1
P
}
Open
P
{
xy−→
1
P ′
}
νyP
{
x(y)−→
1
P ′
} x 6= y
Res
P
{
µi−→
pi
Pi
}
i
νyP
{
µi−→
p′i
νyPi
}
i:y6∈fn(µi)
∃i. y 6∈ fn(µi) and
∀i. p′i = pi/
∑
j:y6∈fn(µj) pj
Par
P
{
µi−→
pi
Pi
}
i
P | Q
{
µi−→
pi
Pi | Q
}
i
bn(µ) ∩ fn(Q ) = ∅
Com
P
{
xy−→
1
P ′
}
Q
{
µi−→
pi
Qi
}
i
P | Q
{
τ−→
pi
P ′ | Qi
}
i:µi=x(y)
∪
{
µi−→
pi
P | Qi
}
i:µi 6=x(y)
if µi = x(z) then z = y
Close
P
{
x(y)−→
1
P ′
}
Q
{
µi−→
pi
Qi
}
i
P | Q
{
τ−→
pi
νy(P ′ | Qi)
}
i:µi=x(y)
∪
{
µi−→
pi
P | Qi
}
i:µi 6=x(y)
if µi = x(z) then z = y
Cong
P ≡ P ′ P ′
{
µi−→
pi
Q ′i
}
i
∀i. Q ′i ≡ Qi
P
{
µi−→
pi
Qi
}
i
Proposition 6. (4)⇔ (5), (6)
Proof. (4)⇒ (5)
p(a(i)) =
∑
o
p(a(i) and o) by the disjointness of the anonymous actions
=
∑
o
p(a(i)|o) p(o) by definition of conditional probability
=
∑
o
p(a(j)|o) p(o) by (4)
=
∑
o
p(a(j) and o)
= p(a(j))
(4)⇒ (6)
p(o|a(i)) = p(a(i)|o) p(o)p(a(i)) by Bayes theorem
= p(a(j)|o) p(o)p(a(i)) by (4)
= p(a(j)|o) p(o)p(a(j)) by (5)
= p(o|a(j)) by Bayes theorem
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(4)⇐ (5), (6)
p(a(i)|o) = p(o|a(i)) p(a(i))p(o) by Bayes theorem
= p(o|a(j)) p(a(i))p(o) by (6)
= p(o|a(j)) p(a(j))p(o) by (5)
= p(a(j)|o) by Bayes theorem. 
References
[1] Martín Abadi, Cédric Fournet, Private authentication, Theoretical Computer Science 322 (3) (2004) 427–476.
[2] Martín Abadi, Andrew D. Gordon, A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus, Information and Computation 148 (1) (1999) 1–70.
[3] RobertoM.Amadio, Denis Lugiez, On the reachability problem in cryptographic protocols, in: Proceedings of CONCUR00, in: LectureNotes in Computer
Science, vol. 1877, Springer, 2000, INRIA Research Report 3915, March 2000.
[4] Romain Beauxis, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, Prakash Panangaden, Formal approaches to information-hiding (tutorial),
in: Gilles Barthe, Cédric Fournet (Eds.), Proceedings of the Third Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing, TGC 2007, in: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 4912, Springer, 2008, pp. 347–362.
[5] Mohit Bhargava, Catuscia Palamidessi, Probabilistic anonymity, in: Martín Abadi, Luca de Alfaro (Eds.), Proceedings of CONCUR, in: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 3653, Springer, 2005, pp. 171–185. http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/catuscia/papers/Anonymity/concur.pdf.
[6] Michele Boreale, Davide Sangiorgi, Some congruence properties forpi-calculus bisimilarities, Theoretical Computer Science 198 (1–2) (1998) 159–176.
[7] Konstantinon Chatzikokolakis, Gethin Norman, David Parker, Bisimulation for demonic schedulers, in: Luca De Alfaro (Ed.), Proceedings of the Twelfth
International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures, FOSSACS 2009, York, UK, March 2009, in: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 5504, Springer, 2009, pp. 318–332.
[8] Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, Making random choices invisible to the scheduler, in: Luís Caires, Vasco Thudichum Vasconcelos
(Eds.), Proceedings of CONCUR’07, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4703, Springer, 2007, pp. 42–58. http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/
catuscia/papers/Scheduler/report.pdf.
[9] Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, Prakash Panangaden, Anonymity protocols as noisy channels, Information and Computation 206
(2–4) (2008) 378–401. http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/catuscia/papers/Anonymity/Channels/full.pdf.
[10] Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, Prakash Panangaden, On the bayes risk in information-hiding protocols, Journal of Computer
Security 16 (5) (2008) 531–571.
[11] David Chaum, The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability, Journal of Cryptology 1 (1988) 65–75.
[12] Ian Clarke, Oskar Sandberg, Brandon Wiley, Theodore W. Hong, Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system,
in: Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, in: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 2009, Springer, 2000, pp. 44–66.
[13] Claudia Díaz, Stefaan Seys, Joris Claessens, Bart Preneel, Towards measuring anonymity, in: Roger Dingledine, Paul F. Syverson (Eds.), Proceedings of
the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PET 2002, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2482, Springer, 2002, pp. 54–68.
[14] R.D. Gill, M. van der Laan, J. Robins, Coarsening at random: Characterizations, conjectures and counterexamples, in: D.Y. Lin, T.R. Fleming (Eds.),
Proceedings of the First Seattle Symposium in Biostatistics, in: Lecture Notes in Statistics, Springer, 1997, pp. 255–294.
[15] P.D. Grunwald, J.Y. Halpern, Updating probabilities, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 19 (2003) 243–278.
[16] Joseph Y. Halpern, Kevin R. O’Neill, Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems, Journal of Computer Security 13 (3) (2005) 483–512.
[17] OlteaMihaelaHerescu, Catuscia Palamidessi, Probabilistic asynchronouspi-calculus, in: Jerzy Tiuryn (Ed.), Proceedings of FOSSACS 2000 (Part of ETAPS
2000), in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1784, Springer, 2000, pp. 146–160. http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/∼catuscia/papers/Prob_asy_
pi/fossacs.ps.
[18] C.A.R. Hoare, Communicating Sequential Processes, Prentice-Hall, 1985.
[19] Dominic Hughes, Vitaly Shmatikov, Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: A modular approach, Journal of Computer Security 12 (1) (2004)
3–36.
[20] Steve Kremer, Mark D. Ryan, Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi-calculus, in: Mooly Sagiv (Ed.), Programming Languages and
Systems — Proceedings of the 14th European Symposium on Programming, ESOP’05, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3444, Springer,
Edinburgh, U.K., 2005, pp. 186–200.
[21] Gavin Lowe, Casper: A compiler for the analysis of security protocols, in: Proceedings of 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1997,
Journal of Computer Security 6 (1998) 53–84.
[22] Pasquale Malacaria, Assessing security threats of looping constructs, in: Martin Hofmann, Matthias Felleisen (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34th ACM
SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL 2007, Nice, France, 17–19 January, 2007, ACM, 2007, pp. 225–235.
[23] Pasquale Malacaria, Han Chen, Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models, in: Úlfar Erlingsson,
Marco Pistoia (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2008 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security, PLAS 2008, ACM, Tucson, AZ, USA,
2008, pp. 135–146.
[24] R. Milner, Communication and concurrency, in: International Series in Computer Science, Prentice Hall, 1989.
[25] Robin Milner, Joachim Parrow, David Walker, A calculus of mobile processes, I and II, Information and Computation 100 (1) (1992) 1–40, 41–77. A
preliminary version appeared as Technical Reports ECF-LFCS-89-85 and -86, University of Edinburgh, 1989.
[26] Catuscia Palamidessi, Comparing the expressive power of the synchronous and the asynchronous pi-calculus, in: Conference Record of POPL ’97: The
24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, Paris, France, 1997, pp. 256–265,.
[27] Catuscia Palamidessi, Oltea M. Herescu, A randomized encoding of the pi-calculus with mixed choice, Theoretical Computer Science 335 (2–3) (2005)
373–404. http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/∼catuscia/papers/prob_enc/report.pdf.
[28] Michael K. Reiter, Aviel D. Rubin, Crowds: Anonymity forWeb transactions, ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 1 (1) (1998) 66–92.
[29] A.W. Roscoe, Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR, in: Proceedings of the 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Workshop, IEEE Computer Soc Press, 1995, pp. 98–107.
[30] Peter Y. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols, Addison-Wesley, 2001.
[31] Davide Sangiorgi, pi-calculus, internal mobility and agent-passing calculi, Theoretical Computer Science 167 (1–2) (1996) 235–274.
[32] S. Schneider, Security properties and CSP, in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium Security and Privacy, 1996.
R. Beauxis, C. Palamidessi / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 4006–4025 4025
[33] Steve Schneider, Abraham Sidiropoulos, CSP and anonymity, in: Proc. of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS,
in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1146, Springer, 1996, pp. 198–218.
[34] Roberto Segala, Nancy Lynch, Probabilistic simulations for probabilistic processes, Nordic Journal of Computing 2 (2) (1995) 250–273, An extended
abstract appeared in: Proceedings of CONCUR’94, in: LNCS, vol. 836, pp. 481–496.
[35] Andrei Serjantov, George Danezis, Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity, in: Roger Dingledine, Paul F. Syverson (Eds.), Proceedings
of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PET 2002, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2482, Springer, 2002, pp. 41–53.
[36] Geoffrey Smith, On the foundations of quantitative information flow, in: Luca De Alfaro (Ed.), Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on
Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures, FOSSACS 2009, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5504, Springer, York, UK,
2009, pp. 288–302.
[37] Paul F. Syverson, Stuart G. Stubblebine, Group principals and the formalization of anonymity, in: World Congress on Formal Methods, vol. 1, 1999, pp.
814–833.
[38] P.F. Syverson, D.M.Goldschlag,M.G. Reed, Anonymous connections andonion routing, in: IEEE SymposiumonSecurity andPrivacy, Oakland, California,
1997, pp. 44–54.
